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SINGAPORE SLING: WIPO PASSES THE BUCK
ON MEANINGFUL REFORM OF
INTERNATIONAL TRADEMARK LAW
I. INTRODUCTION
Trademarks today exist in a world where political borders mean
less than they ever have. Teenagers crave Nikes and Nokias from
Moscow to Muncie and from Shanghai to Sdo Paulo. Exports and
imports have become an ever-increasing part of the American
economy. As part of this expansion of international trade,
agreements such as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
("GATT") and the North American Free Trade Agreement
("NAFTA") established general rules for the reduction of trade
barriers.
As a part of the general trend towards promoting greater
freedom of trade, the World Intellectual Property Organization
("WIPO") has sought to harmonize national intellectual property
laws, including the laws concerning trademarks. The part of the
effort aimed at trademark law was initially meant to standardize
both substantive and procedural matters, but due to the enormity of
the task, the eventual diplomatic conference focused solely on the
procedural aspects of trademark law.' This diplomatic conference,
held at Geneva in 1994, produced the Trademark Law Treaty
(hereinafter, "1994 Treaty").2 This treaty sets maximum limits on
the procedures nations can impose on trademark holders and has
become an accepted standard even for those nations which are not
signatories.
1. Timothy W. Blakely, Beyond the International Harmonization of
Trademark Law: The Community Trade Mark as a Model of Unitary
Transnational Trademark Protection, 149 U. PA. L. REv. 309, 320-322 (2000).
2. Trademark Law Treaty, Oct. 27, 1994, S. TREATY Doc. No. 105-35, 2037
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Other international agreements entered into around the same
time dealt specifically with intellectual property law and included
the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights (TRIPS), which accompanied the Uruguay Round of
GATT, signed in 1994, as well as the Protocol Relating to the
Madrid Agreement (Madrid Protocol), signed in 1996. As always,
however, problems arose within the world of international
trademark practice, and legislators across the world began to hear
calls for changes and additions to the existing treaties.
In the spring of 2006, dignitaries from over one hundred WIPO
Member Nations gathered in Singapore "to create a modern and
dynamic international framework for the harmonization of
administrative trademark registration procedures."3  This was a
departure from WIPO's previous "soft law" approach of
promulgating "suggested practices" that member nations could
voluntarily choose to adopt, rather than a "hard law" approach of
binding international agreements.4 The most likely impetus for
this departure from the soft law emphasis was the adoption of the
WIPO Development Agenda5 during the 2004 WIPO General
Assembly meeting. This development agenda, sponsored
primarily by nations from the developing world,6 advocated a
much more active position for WIPO and a more aggressive stance
on norm-setting by WIPO. The end goal of the development
3. World Intellectual Property Organization [WIPO], Summary of the
Singapore Treaty on the Law of Trademarks (2006),
http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/singapore/summary-singapore.html (last
visited Nov. 1, 2007).
4. Edward Kwakwa, Some Comments on Rulemaking at the World
Intellectual Property Organization, 12 DuKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 179, 187-88
(2002).
5. WIPO, Proposal by Argentina and Brazil for the Establishment of a
Development Agenda for WIPO, WIPO Doc. WO/GA/31/I l(Aug. 27, 2004),
available at http://www.wipo.int/documents/en/document/govbody/wo-gb-ga/
pdf/wo-ga31 11 .pdf.
6. Id. at 2. The primary sponsors were Argentina and Brazil, who were
joined by Bolivia, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, India, Iran,
Kenya, Peru, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Tanzania and Venezuela in the
General Assembly. WIPO, General Assembly (31st Session) Report, at 33,
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agenda was to place WIPO in a position where it could sufficiently
influence international IP law in ways which would further the
development of poorer nations and prevent developed nations and
multinational corporations from abusing IP law in ways which
would hinder growth in the developing world.
The previous soft law emphasis did, as shown below, strongly
influence the drafting of the eventual treaty. The Singapore
Diplomatic Conference resulted in a treaty which made several
major revisions and additions to the text of the 1994 Treaty. This
was done to address concerns by trademark offices and trademark
holders that major procedural aspects related to trademark law
were left ungoverned by the 1994 Treaty. This lack of regulation,
it was argued, led to unreasonable demands on trademark holders
and to a greater unpredictability within those areas which were not
covered by the old treaty.
This article continues in Part Two by discussing the reaction to
the 1994 Treaty and the circumstances which led to the decision by
WIPO to propose the adoption of a new treaty. Part Three
explains how the newly re-written treaty, The Singapore Treaty on
the Law of Trademarks7 (hereinafter "New Treaty" or "Singapore
Treaty"), highlights the way in which it differs from the 1994
Treaty and provides reasons for each of the changes. Part Three
also explores the potential implications of these changes from the
1994 Treaty. Part Four analyzes the effectiveness of these changes
in implementing three different justifications for the harmonization
of trademarks. Finally, the article concludes by presenting the
argument that the Singapore Treaty makes mainly superficial
changes and fails to seriously further the stated goals of
International Harmonization advocates.
II. BACKGROUND
International agreements governing the protection of trademarks
have existed since the Paris Convention in 1883. The Paris
Convention established two basic principles: equal rights between
nationals of a country and foreigners, as regards to protection of
7. Singapore Treaty on the Law of Trademarks, Mar. 27, 2006, S. TREATY
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marks, and international priority in the use of a mark.8 Since then,
other treaties such as the Madrid Agreement (1892) have paved the
way for international goods like Coca-Cola, BMW and Sony to
become well-recognized and popular with consumers the world
over. But despite this long history of international cooperation in
trademark law, major conflicts, like that based on the requirement
of actual use of a mark in common law countries, still exist.
The original Trademark Law Treaty ("1994 Treaty") was signed
by the representatives of thirty-five nations,9 including the United
States, China, Great Britain and Russia, in the same year as the
GATT agreement which created the World Trade Organization
(WTO). NAFTA went into effect in 1994 as well, and both GATT
and NAFTA had the effect of unleashing an unforeseen period of
globalization and increased international trade, which contributed
to the economic boom of the late 1990s. The 1994 Treaty's main
effect was to set forth measures allowing for the standardization of
elements of procedure concerning trademarks, including the
process of application, representation, the use of a single
registration for multiple classes of marks, changes in names,
addresses or ownership, providing for the correction of mistake
and ensuring that service marks received the same treatment as
trademarks.'" The 1994 Treaty set forth clear standards such as a
ten-year registration period and trademark classification abiding by
the Nice Agreement standards." By 1996, the agreement was
hailed as a success "with far greater acceptance and
standardization than had been hoped or expected". 2 While many
8. Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property art. 2, 4, March
20, 1883, 21 U.S.T. 1538, 828 U.N.T.S. 305 [hereinafter Paris Convention],
available at http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/paris/trtdocswo02O.html.
9. See WIPO, List of Signatories to 1994 Treaty,
http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ShowResults.j sp?lang=en&searchwhat=N&tre
aty-id=5 (last visited Nov. 1, 2007) (the 1994 Treaty now has thirty-nine
signatories).
10. Marshall A. Leaffer, The New World of International Trademark Law 2
MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REv. 1, 20-21 (1998).
11. WIPO, Summary of the Trademark Law Treaty (1994),
http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/tlt/summary-tlt.html (last visited Nov. 1,
2007).
12. Allan Greenberg, Trends in International Trademark Law, in 3
INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW & POLICY 32 (Hugh C. Hansen
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nations have not explicitly signed on to the treaty, most notably
India, it has become the guideline for their procedures regarding
trademarks. 3 Because the 1994 Treaty had been modestly drafted
to encourage widespread adoption, proponents of a stronger treaty
which would ensure greater harmonization of trademark laws were
encouraged by the progress of the original and hoped to continue
that work. With the rise of globalization, the popularization of the
internet, and other technical advances, some areas of the treaty,
most notably communications and non-standard marks, became
outdated.
14
The WIPO Standing Committee on the Law of Trademarks,
Industrial Designs and Geographical Indications (hereinafter,
"Standing Committee") has monitored the state of international
trademark law since 1998. As early as its first session, proposals
for revision of the Trademark Law Treaty were already being
discussed.' 5 By 2002, the Standing Committee concluded that
revision of the 1994 Treaty was necessary and called for the
convening of a diplomatic conference to do so.'6 Work began
within the Standing Committee to develop the elements of the new
treaty, modeling some of the new aspects on the Patent Law Treaty
of 2000." The Standing Committee considered amending the
treaty to deal with substantive trademark issues (inclusion of
dilution, etc.), but rejected the idea after consultation with parties
to the treaty.' 8 The Standing Committee approved a final draft of
ed., 1998).
13. Id.
14. The New Singapore Treaty on the Law of Trademarks: What Does it
Change?, WIPO MAGAZINE (Switz.), June 2006, at 7, available at
http://www.wipo.int/wipo-magazine/en/2006/03/article_0002.html.
15. WIPO, Organizational Matters and Overview of the Issues to be
Considered by the Standing Committee on the Law of Trademarks, Industrial
Designs, and Geographical Indications, at 4-10, WIPO Doc. SCT/1/2 (May 29,
1998), available at http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/sct/en/sct_1/sct-1_2.pdf.
16. WIPO, Proposals for Further Harmonization of Formalities and
Procedures in the Field of Marks, at 2, WIPO Doe. SCT/8/2 (Apr. 26, 2002)
available at http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/sct/en/sct_8/sct8_2.doc.
17. WIPO, Summary by the Chair, Standing Committee on the Law of
Trademarks, Industrial Designs and Geographical Indications: Eighth Session,
WIPO Doe. SCT/8/6 (May 31, 2002), available at
http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/sct/en/sct_8/sct_8_6.doc.
18. WIPO, Summary by the Chair, Standing Committee on the Law of
2007]
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the proposed Treaty in April 2005."9 The Diplomatic Conference
for the Adoption of a Revised Trademark Law Treaty began on
March 13, 2006 in Singapore and lasted for two weeks. The
Conference produced the final version of the Singapore Treaty.2 °
The Standing Committee presented a fairly progressive draft treaty
for consideration before the conference which significantly altered
several aspects of the 1994 Treaty. Although many nations, from
Iran to France, submitted proposals during the Conference, the
Treaty in its final form strongly resembled the draft developed by
the Standing Committee.
III. PROPOSED LEGISLATION - NEW ELEMENTS TO THE
TREATY
There are five major ways in which the Singapore Treaty differs
from the 1994 Treaty. All five of these changes were included in
the proposed draft by the Standing Committee.
First, the scope of the treaty was expanded. While the 1994
Treaty only covered visible two-dimensional marks (and allowed
for limited coverage of three-dimensional marks), the Singapore
Treaty covers all forms of marks, including holograms, motion
marks, and non-visible (audible and olfactory) marks.21 Second,
the treaty revises the rules governing communications made by
mark holders, applicants, or other interested persons (hereinafter,
"interested persons") to the trademark offices with which those
interested persons must work. Most notably, the regulations
governing electronic communications have been expanded and
Trademarks, Industrial Designs and Geographical Indications: Fifteenth
Session, at 2, WIPO Doc. SCT/15/4 (Dec. 2, 2005) available at
http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/sct/en/sct_15/sct_15_4.doc.
19. WIPO, Update 248: Member States Agree Basic Text for Revised TLT,
Consider Singapore Offer to Host Diplomatic Conference, WIPO Doc.
UPD/2005/248 (Apr. 28, 2005), available at
http://www.wipo.int/edocs/prdocs/en/2005/wipo-upd.2005_248.html.
20. Press Release 442, WIPO, Negotiators Adopt Singapore Treaty to
Facilitate International Trademark Registration, WIPO Doc. PR/2006/442
(Mar. 28, 2006), available at http://www.wipo.int/edocs/prdocs/en/2006/
wipo-pr_2006442.html.
21. Singapore Treaty, supra note 7, art. 2, para. 1(a).
310
6
DePaul Journal of Art, Technology & Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 17, Iss. 2 [2016], Art. 4
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol17/iss2/4
SINGAPORE SLING
modernized.2  Third, the treaty now requires and specifies
appropriate relief measures when an interested party fails to
comply with certain time limits. 23  Fourth, guidelines governing
official recording (referred to in the treaty as "recordal") of
trademark licenses were included in the treaty.24 Lastly, the treaty
created a Trademark Law Treaty Assembly (hereinafter
"Trademark Assembly") within WIPO to oversee future changes
to the treaty and to issue new accompanying regulations or modify
those already in place. 5
Because the treaty was modified in a way that dealt with
completely separate issues of trademark procedure, each change
stands on its own and needs to be analyzed as such. However, a
common thread runs between most of the changes. A reading of
the treaty in its entirety reveals that it seeks to simplify as much as
possible any dealings interested persons will have with national
trademark offices and prevent individual nations from finding
loopholes to formal adherence to the terms of the treaty.26
Whether the New Treaty actually meets those lofty goals will be
discussed in Part Four of this article.
Accompanying the treaty is a set of regulations27 (hereinafter,
"Regulations") which lay out the specifics of the procedural
requirements implemented by the treaty. With the creation of the
Trademark Assembly, the Regulations can also be more easily
amended than the treaty itself. Because of this, the Regulations
also incorporate many additional requirements which are more
likely to need amendment given the fast-changing nature of
intellectual property law. The drafters also created a set of model
forms for all of the procedures referred to in the treaty,28 which are
22. Id. art. 8.
23. Id. art. 14.
24. Id. arts. 17-20.
25. Id. art. 23.
26. See Press Release 438, WIPO, Top Officials to Open Diplomatic
Conference to Revise Key Trademark Treaty in Singapore, WIPO Doc.
PRJ2006/438 (Mar 13, 2006), available at
http://www.wipo.int/edocs/prdocs/en/2006/wipo-pr_-2006_438.html.
27. WIPO, Regulations Under the Singapore Treaty on the Law of
Trademarks, http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/singapore/regulations.html (last
visited Nov. 1, 2007) [hereinafter Regulations Under the Singapore Treaty].
28. Forms include: Application for Registration, Request for Renewal,
2007]
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meant to serve as templates for national trademark offices and can
be substituted for a particular country's procedural forms.
The Singapore Treaty, like the 1994 Treaty, limits itself to
harmonization of the procedural aspects of the trademark laws of
the signatories of the Treaty (hereinafter, "Contracting Parties"),2 9
as opposed to substantive elements, which are already loosely
governed by the Paris Convention and the Agreement on Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights ("TRIPS").3" In
fact, substantive trademark law was specifically ruled out by the
Standing Committee prior to the diplomatic conference which
approved the Singapore Treaty.3' Members of the Treaty are wary
of losing their independent control over substantive issues, while
harmonization of procedure has little to no impact on policy and is
less of a concern to legislatures and the public.
A. Expansion of the Scope of the Treaty
At its very outset, the 1994 Treaty was limited in its scope and
did not govern all actions made by national trademark offices.32
Article Two, Paragraph One of the 1994 Treaty restricts the scope
of the treaty to procedures and regulations governing "marks
consisting of visible signs," with the caveat that "only those
Contracting Parties which accept for registration three-dimensional
marks shall be obliged to apply this Treaty to such marks."33 Part
(b) of Paragraph One specifically excluded "hologram marks and.
Request for the Correction of Mistake, etc.
29. Due to the inclusion of the European Union as a signatory, alongside its
member states (due to the nature of the Community Trade Marks Office), the
term "nations" is not entirely appropriate for use here. The Treaty therefore
uses the term "Contracting Parties" and that convention is followed in this
article.
30. TRIPS specifically incorporates the bulk of the substantive provisions of
the Paris and Berne Conventions. See Graeme B. Dinwoodie, Some Remarks on
the Limits of Harmonization, 5 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 596, 597
(2006).
31. WIPO, Organizational Matters, supra note 15, at 2.
32. See Ladas & Parry LLP, The Trademark Law Treaty,
http://www.ladas.com/Trademarks/MadridAgreement/Madrid05.htm (last
visited Nov. 1, 2007).
33. 1994 Treaty, supra note 2, art. 2, para. (1)(a) (emphasis added).
312
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•. marks not consisting of visible signs, in particular, sound marks
and olfactory marks."34 These exclusions were made to maintain
uniformity as non-standard marks were rare and not recognized by
many nations. Although the United States does recognize non-
visual trademarks," the more standard marks covered by the 1994
treaty constituted approximately "ninety-nine percent of the marks
filed in the United States Patent and Trademark Office" at the time
the treaty was presented to the Senate for ratification in November
1997.36
As a result of advances in technology and free trade since 1994,
the prevalence of non-visible and other excluded trademarks has
increased.3 7 In 2002, WIPO recommended that the scope of the
Treaty be widened to cover these marks as well.38 This was
viewed by some members as a controversial move because
acceptance of non-standard marks was considered a substantive
issue beyond the scope of the Singapore Treaty, and the Standing
Committee only moved forward after distributing a questionnaire
on the subject to its member states and international
organizations.39 Because of the lack of general acceptance of these
non-traditional marks, the exception which previously allowed
Contracting Parties to not recognize three-dimensional marks was
expanded to cover all marks. This allows holders of non-
traditional marks to receive the benefits of the treaty in those
countries where their marks are valid. This can be done without
imposing the requirement that any nation which chooses to not
34. Id. art. 2, para. (1)(b).
35. See, e.g., In re Clarke, 17 U.S.P.Q.2d 1238 (T.T.A.B. 1990) (recognizing
olfactory mark); In re Gen. Elec. Broad. Co., 199 U.S.P.Q. 560 (T.T.A.B. 1978)
(recognizing sound mark).
36. See 1994 Treaty, supra note 2.
37. Randall Frost, Trademarking: Senses & Sensibility,
BRANDCHANNEL.COM, Apr. 26, 2004, http://www.brandchannel.com/features
effect.asp?pfid=207.
38. WIPO, Proposals for Further Harmonization, supra note 16, at 2.
39. WIPO, Questionnaire on Trademark Law and Practice, at 2-4, WIPO
Doc. SCT/l 1/6 (July 31, 2003), available at http://www.wipo.int/edocs/
mdocs/sct/en/sct_1 1/sct_11_6-editablel.pdf.
40. WIPO, Notes on the Basic Proposalfor a Revised Trademark Law Treaty
and Regulations Thereunder, at 6, WIPO Doc. TLT/R/DC/5 (Oct. 5, 2005)
[hereinafter Treaty Notes], available at http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/
mdocs/en/tlt_r dc/tlt r dc_5.pdf.
2007] 313
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recognize such marks altogether be forced to accept them as a
result of the Treaty.
The new Article 2(1)(a) simplifies the procedural rules by
ensuring that the Treaty applies to every type of mark which a
nation may choose to place under the protection of its trademark
laws. Rather than enumerating which types of marks are included,
excluded, or may be included under certain conditions, this rule
covers all marks, without making distinction between them. This
reduces any interference the Treaty may have with a participating
nation/organization's substantive trademark law. It also allows
room for the emergence of new kinds of marks which may develop
as a result of further technological innovation, without requiring a
rewrite of the Treaty to ensure that fair treatment is accorded to
holders of those new types of marks.
B. Communications: Article 8
A second change implemented by the new treaty is the revision
of standards for communications made to the trademark offices of
the Contracting Parties.41 Due to the rapid growth in the use of
electronic communications after 1994, including e-mail and online
registration, the old principles governing, among other things,
signatures and "telefacsimile communications,"42 became
outdated.43 In the 1994 Treaty, provisions concerning the form of
communications permitted were separately placed in almost every
Article.' The old Article 8 also set forth elaborate provisions
regarding signatures on paper documents, but had only a cursory
mention of electronic communications.45
In the 1994 Treaty, Article 8 was titled "Signature," reflecting
the importance that paper documents and their accompanying
authentication had in the pre-Internet world.46 Article 8 has now
been renamed "Communications" and places far less of an
41. Singapore Treaty, supra note 7, art. 8.
42. Also known as "faxes."
43. See The New Singapore Treaty on the Law of Trademarks: What Does it
Change?, supra note 14.
44. See 1994 Treaty, supra note 2, arts. 3, 5, 10-13.
45. Id. art. 8, para. 3.
46. Id. art. 8.
10
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emphasis on paper forms.47 The new Communications article, like
Paragraph One of Article Two described above, takes all of the
clauses concerning any communication about any aspect of a mark
and merges them into one rule, eliminating the possibility that
identical language could be interpreted differently for different
communications. Under the 1994 Treaty, unscrupulous trademark
officials could claim that the identical phrase, "[a]ny Contracting
Party may require that the application be in the language, or in one
of the languages, admitted by the Office," had a different meaning
in Article 11 (Change in Ownership) as it did in Article 12
(Correction of a Mistake), due to the rule of surplusage, or any
other convenient pretext. Now, each of the articles which
previously had its own provisions regarding communications
simply directs the reader to Article 8 instead.48
Article 8 allows a Contracting Party to choose the form of
communication it will accept. "Any Contracting Party may choose
the means of transmittal of communications and whether it accepts
communications on paper,.. . in electronic form or any other form
of communication. 49  This is a major step away from the 1994
Treaty, which required acceptance of signed writings on paper for
most categories. With the new provision, offices are potentially
free to switch to all-electronic operations. The requirement of
acceptance of any application which conforms to the Model Forms
provided with the New Treaty" has been clarified and is now
uniform for all of the Model Forms."' The provisions dealing with
the language of communications, which previously specified
documents requiring translation, are now expanded to allow for
translation of any communication. 2 This has been tempered,
however, as the New Treaty allows restrictions requiring
translation into only one language and prohibitions on requiring
certification of translations. 3
47. Singapore Treaty, supra note 7, art. 8.
48. See id. arts. 3, 5, 10-17.
49. Id. art. 8, para. 1.
50. Model Forms were also provided with the 1994 Treaty, but requirement
of use was scattered through the Treaty, as with all other communications rules.
51. Singapore Treaty, supra note 7, art. 8, para. 5.
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It ...enables a Contracting Party to require that
some indications or elements of the communication,
such as the list of goods and services, be in a
language admitted by the Office which does not
necessarily have to be the official language of the
Office, and that some other indications or elements
of the communication be in the official language of
the Office. 4
Signatures may still be required on paper communications, but
the specifics have been moved out of the Treaty itself and into the
more easily modified Regulations. 5' Rule Six of the Regulations
now also specifies that receipt of communications can be
considered to have occurred when the communication has been
made to an official postal service or an authorized delivery service,
along with direct delivery to an official branch of the trademark
office. 6 This officially incorporates the traditional common law
"mailbox rule"57 rather than requiring the date of receipt to be the
actual date on which a mailed or delivered communication arrives
at its destination.
New rules on electronic methods of communications have
replaced the vague and now-outdated rules on "telefacsimile"
communications.5 To simplify the process of adjusting to rapidly-
changing technology, the requirements have been shifted to the
Regulations, which currently allow for requirements of electronic
authentication, as well as requirements that electronic submissions
be accompanied by a paper copy, albeit with a one-month grace
period.5 ' These changes were made to mirror similar provisions in
the Patent Law Treaty. While not specified in the Singapore Treaty
itself, the supplementary Resolution by the Diplomatic Conference
issued along with the Treaty emphasized that these provisions do
54. Treaty Notes, supra note 40, at 10.
55. Singapore Treaty, supra note 7, art. 8, para. 3.
56. Regulations Under the Singapore Treaty, supra note 27, Rule 6, para. 7.
57. An acceptance is transmitted the moment it leaves the sender's control
(i.e. being placed in a mailbox). See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §
64 (2007).
58. Singapore Treaty, supra note 7, art. 8, para. 4.
59. Regulations Under the Singapore Treaty, supra note 27, Rule 5.
316
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not oblige any Contracting Party to implement "electronic filing
systems or other automation systems."6 This ensures that smaller
and poorer countries, which do not yet possess the necessary
technological resources, will not be forced to implement such
systems.
The Treaty now explicitly prohibits any application of the
requirements authorized by the Treaty towards "communication
between an applicant, holder or other interested person and its
representative."61  Any requirements mandated by a Contracting
Party must concern communications made to the Contracting Party
itself. This procedural requirement may be self-evident to those
who have become accustomed to the strong tradition of lawyer-
client confidentiality in common law nations, especially the United
States. The globalization of trademark law has made the
provisions of the Treaty especially important in nations without
such protections, particularly in the former communist bloc and
the developing world (China being the most prominent example).
This is again an example of the Treaty's underlying purpose of
reducing trademark agency interference with interested persons in
general.
Lastly, the Treaty now explicitly prohibits any other outside
rules regarding any communications for purposes of national
trademark law.62 Article 8 is the outer bounds of what procedures
can be required of interested persons when communicating with
trademark offices. This catchall prevents any bad-faith attempts
by Contracting Parties to place additional hurdles in the path of
interested persons, allowing those parties to concentrate on the
substantial portions of their applications, claims, or any other
important communication with a trademark office, rather than
being forced to waste valuable time and energy on purely
procedural matters.
60. WIPO, Resolution by the Diplomatic Conference supplementary to the
Singapore Treaty on the Law of Trademarks and the Regulations Thereunder,
para. 3(ii), http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/singapore/resolution.html (last
visited Nov. 1, 2007) [hereinafter Diplomatic Resolution].
61. Singapore Treaty, supra note 7, art. 8, para. 7.
62. Id. art. 8, para. 6.
2007] 317
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C. Relief Measures for Failure to Comply with Time Limits:
Article 14
Concerns about adverse actions taken against parties whose only
fault is a failure to meet time requirements were raised as early as
2001.63 Efforts to include provisions dealing with relief for those
parties have been present in all discussions of possible revisions of
the Trademark Law Treaty. The new provisions added to the
Singapore Treaty in Article 14 deal with two types of relief:
requests for relief before the deadline in question has expired'
and those made after the expiration of the time limit.65 The
Singapore Treaty appears to only allow relief measures for
applications and registrations. Article 14 specifically mentions
those two categories and does not mention changes in name or
address, changes in ownership, correction of mistake, or licensing
of marks.
In the case where an Interested Person has knowledge that they
will not be able to meet a certain deadline and requests relief
before the time limit passes, Article Fourteen, Paragraph One of
the Treaty is non-intrusive. It allows Contracting Parties to provide
for the filing of an extension of that time limit in any manner they
see fit.66 Trademark Offices are also free not to provide such
relief. This is not a major concern, as Interested Parties may wait
until after the deadline expires and opt to seek some relief under
the second clause of Article Fourteen.
Paragraph Two of Article Fourteen, which deals with relief
measures after the deadline has passed, is much more involved.
Paragraph Two requires that the office in question provide specific
63. WIPO, Overview of the Possible Issues to be Considered by the Standing
Committee on the Law of Trademarks, Industrial Designs and Geographical
Indications, para. 15, WIPO Doc. SCT/6/4 (December 22, 2000), available at
http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/sct/en/sct_6/sct_6_4.pdf.
64. Singapore Treaty, supra note 7, art. 14, para. 1.
65. Id. art. 14, para. 2.
66. Id. art. 14, para. 1.
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listed relief measures.67 The relief measures available under the
New Treaty are: (1) extension of the time limit for no less than two
months, (2) continuing the process of the application or
registration, or (3) in the case of honest mistake, the reinstatement
of the rights of the concerned person.6"
Of course, these remedies cannot be applied across the board,
and several exceptions are listed in the Regulations69 for which the
remedies are not available.7° These include:
(i) Missing a deadline which has already been
expanded pursuant to Article 14(2) of the
Treaty,
(ii) Filing a request for relief from failing to
meet a deadline,
(iii) Failure to pay a renewal fee,
(iv) Actions before review bodies of the Office
in question,
(v) Actions in interpartes proceedings,
(vi) Applications to take advantage of the
priority of an earlier application or display
of goods and/or services in an exhibition,
(vii) Filing a declaration to establish a new filing
date for an application, and
(viii) Correction or addition of a priority claim.7 1
The exclusion of many of these categories is self-evident, as
granting relief for lateness would either undo the spirit of the
category (e.g. filing for priority) or interfere unduly with national
judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings. The intent is to make
remedies available for honest mistakes, not to allow loopholes and
67. Id. art. 14, para. 2.
68. Id.
69. As opposed to the Treaty itself, for easier amendment.
70. Singapore Treaty, supra note 7, art. 14, para. 3.
71. Regulations Under the Singapore Treaty, supra note 27, Rule 9, para. 4.
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more complexity to enter the system.
D. Licensing of Trademarks: Articles 17-20
The fourth change brought about by the New Treaty is the
inclusion of Articles governing how trademark licenses may be
officially recorded.72 Due to the nature of international trade, it is
a common custom for parent corporations to license their easily-
recognizable intellectual property, especially trademarks on
popular brand names, to their foreign subsidiaries or partners.
According to the August 1, 2004 International Trademark
Association (INTA) Bulletin, failure to record a trademark license
in countries that require official recordal of a trademark was the
most common problem in foreign trademark infringement cases.73
Given the amount of licensing and its place in intellectual property
law, proposals for rules governing the requirements for recording
of licenses were brought up at Standing Committee Meetings as
early as September 2000. 74
The new licensing Articles all deal with the rights of both the
Contracting Parties and of the Interested Person who must register
the trademark license in those countries which offer or require the
recording of a license.75 Most importantly, rights granted to
licensees by statute are preserved regardless of recordal or not.76
Article Seventeen is concerned solely with the process of having
a license officially recorded by a Trademark Office.77 Only one
request is sufficient, even when dealing with multiple
marks/registrations, provided the holder and licensee are the same
for all the transactions.78 This reflects the 1994 Treaty's stance on
initial trademark registrations, applications for transfer of
ownership, and other similar transactions. Member Countries may
72. Singapore Treaty, supra note 7, arts. 17-20.
73. Trademark Problems to Avoid, INTA BULLETIN, August 1, 2004, at 4.
74. WIPO, Proposed Joint Recommendation Concerning Trademark
Licenses, WIPO Doe. A/35/10 (July 26, 2000), available at
http://www.wipo.int/documents/en/document/govbody/wo-gb-ab/pdf/a35- IO.p
df.
75. Singapore Treaty, supra note 7, arts. 17-20.
76. Id. art. 19, para. 2.
77. Id. art. 17.
78. Id. art. 17, para. 3.
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only impose the recording requirements in the categories laid out
in the Regulations.79  The Regulations also restrict which
supporting documents must be submitted along with the request.8"
Article Seventeen prohibits countries from imposing three
requirements in particular. No trademark office may require
furnishing of the registration certificate of the mark, furnishing the
licensing contract, or furnishing any "indication of the financial
terms of the license contract." 81 The prohibition on these three
requirements, however, only applies to the request itself.
Contracting Parties are authorized to demand these documents for
other inquiries concerning the licensing agreement.82 Article
Eighteen specifies that only the same requirements applied to
requests for recording in Article Seventeen may be applied to
requests for amendment or cancellation of a license registration.83
Article Nineteen strictly addresses the rights of Interested Parties
as opposed to the practices of Trademark Offices. This Article
outlines the rights that are retained by all parties even when the
licensing of a trademark is not officially recorded.84 As the
inclusion of guidelines for license recording could be seen as
encouraging its requirement, Article Nineteen sets forth that failure
to record a license is not sufficient cause to deny licensees or
holders any rights they have in the marks in question.85 The
Article does not address the issue of whether a licensee has the
right to join proceedings involving a holder or vice-versa, but
failure to record the license cannot be grounds to deny such a right
when the right is given.86 The first section of Article Nineteen also
prohibits countries and organizations from canceling the
registration of a licensed mark if a license to use the mark has not
been properly recorded.87 Article Twenty allows requiring an
79. Id. art. 17, para. 1.
80. Id.
81. Singapore Treaty, supra note 7, art. 17, para. 4(a)(iii). Other
governmental offices may still require the parties to furnish these documents,
for other valid purposes. See Treaty Notes, supra note 40, at 20 n.17.07.
82. Singapore Treaty, supra note 7, art. 17, para. 4.
83. Id. art. 18 para. 2.
84. Id. art. 19, para. 1.
85. Id. art. 19, para. 2.
86. See Treaty Notes, supra note 40, at 21 n.19.03.
87. Singapore Treaty, supra note 7, art. 17, para. 1.
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indication that a mark is being used under a license, but separates
any sanction for violation of that rule from the loss of rights
prohibited in Article Nineteen.88 Article Twenty also ensures that
failure to indicate licensing of a mark will not result in the loss of
registration of the mark by its owner.89
E. Assembly of the Contracting Parties
Finally, what first appears to be the most significant change
brought about by the Singapore Treaty is the creation of an
Assembly of the Contracting Parties. The Trademark Assembly,
modeled after the Patent Law Treaty Assembly, is empowered to
convene conferences for the revision of the Treaty, to amend the
Regulations and determine the conditions for application of those
amendments, as well as "perform such other functions as are
appropriate to implementing the provisions of [the] Treaty." 90
The Assembly will meet at the same time as the WIPO General
Assembly, or at any other time upon the convocation of the
Director-General of WIPO.9" During meetings of the Trademark
Assembly, each nation will have one vote, while
Intergovernmental Organizations representing their members (i.e.
the EU) are given the option of casting as many votes as they have
members who are party to the Treaty.92 The notes to the Treaty
specify that this is an option, and the member states may vote
individually, if they choose. 93 The goals of the Assembly are to
come to decisions by consensus, but for contentious issues, voting
is preferred to non-action. 94 Keeping with the spirit of consensus,
a supermajority two-thirds vote is required for most votes,95 while
an even more restrictive three-quarters vote is required to amend
the Regulations. 96
The Director General and the International Bureau of WIPO will
88. Id. art. 20.
89. Id.
90. Id. art. 23, para. 2.
91. Id. art. 23, para. 6.
92. Id. art. 23, para. 4(b).
93. Treaty Notes, supra note 40, at 2 n.2.01.
94. Singapore Treaty, supra note 7, art. 23, para. 4.
95. Id. art. 23, para. 5.
96. Id. art. 22, para. 2.
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deal with administrative matters relating to the Treaty and the
Assembly.9 7 The Director-General shall, among other things, act
as Secretary of the Assembly at meetings and revision
conferences.98  The International Bureau shall provide the
Assembly with its Secretariat, and is responsible for preparatory
work for any meeting as well as any other tasks assigned to it
which relate to the Treaty.99
IV. ANALYSIS
Many different rationales and goals have been used by various
proponents of global harmonization of intellectual property law.
Most of those rationales, while originally used to promote earlier
endeavors, can be applied equally well to the Singapore Treaty.
Professor Kenneth Port theorized that there are three basic agendas
behind the push for the "harmonization" of trademark law in his
critique of the 1994 Treaty.' The first group seeks to make all
trademark law in the world uniform so that trademark owners,
their lawyers, and other representatives, only have to understand
one set of rules in order to know their rights worldwide.' A
second group hopes to minimize conflict between different sets of
rules without requiring them to be exactly the same, and a third
group wishes to promote measures which "[imply] the creation of
accord or consonance."'0 2 According to Port, these categories are
primarily the desires of trademark holders, diplomats and patent
officials, and academics, respectively.0 3
While the Singapore Treaty certainly satisfies the third category
of expectations, it is the most superficial and least substantive of
the three categories. When using the other two categories as a
means of examining the five major changes to the Treaty, the
effectiveness of the Treaty falls short of the stated goals of its
97. Id. art. 24.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. See Kenneth L. Port, Trademark Harmonization: Norms, Names &
Nonsense, 34-35, 2 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REv. 33 (1998).
101. Id. at 34.
102. Id. at 34-35.
103. Id. at 35.
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drafters either to unify trademark law completely or to minimize
the gaps between different systems."° Therefore, the Treaty fails to
advance the cause of international trademark harmonization.
A. Development towards a Unitary System of Trademark Law
Describing it as an effort to develop a single system of laws
which would apply to trademarks worldwide would be a radical
simplification of the movement towards the unification of law.
Predictability, particularly for those directly affected by the law in
question, is the key consideration. Port defines the process:
[the process is merely an effort to] study similarities
between systems (so that you are comparing
comparables), categorize each system, and
determine the common denominator of substantive
treatment of any given legal issue. Through this
process, theoretical as well as legislative lessons
might be learned to determine what, if anything,
other societies should change in their legal
systems. '05
This implies a series of studies as to the comparative benefits of
the current differences between the various procedures and rules of
trademark law. This is an extension of the concept of individual
states serving as "laboratories of democracy" to actually have
concrete evidence of the success or failure of a particular way of
doing things. WIPO's previous focus on "soft law" initiatives and
the use of the Standing Committee to review proposals are
examples of WIPO's work in this area. But in the end, a single
standard must be chosen, and all local regulations must be made to
correspond to that standard, or else the unitary system will never
come into being. So the question must be asked - does the
Singapore Treaty succeed as a means of providing Interested
104. Press Release 439, WIPO, Dr. Idris Opens Diplomatic Conference to
Revise Key Trademark Treaty, WIPO Doc. PR/2006/439 (Mar 14, 2006),
available at
http://www.wipo.int/edocs/prdocs/en/2006/wipo-pr_2006_439.html
105. Port, supra note 100, at 47 n.53.
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Persons more predictability in their dealings with trademark
offices worldwide?
Unfortunately, the answer is that while some further
harmonization is achieved, trademark owners' lives will not be
made easier as a result of the New Treaty. Examining the effects
of the relevant changes shows that the Treaty sets a basic floor of
generalized right, but leaves the various trademark regimes to their
own devices in terms of how they wish to comply with the new
provisions, as well as granting great latitude to grant greater
protections than those granted by the Treaty. At the expense of
predictability for Interested Persons, the Treaty preserves national
sovereignty and does not significantly lead towards a unitary
system of trademark law.
1. Expansion of Marks Covered by the Treaty
At first glance, the expansion of the number of types of marks
covered by the Treaty would appear to be a definite step towards
uniformity in all types of trademark law. But the new provision is
crafted in such a way as to allow maximum flexibility in the
treatment of non-standard marks by Contracting Parties, and
current differences as to the registrability of three-dimensional,
movement, sound, and other marks remain intact. WIPO
maintains that the Treaty retains the power to "define relevant
standards, once the treaty has entered into force and once there is
agreement on the substance of such standards,"16 but such
statements are premised on WIPO's future ability to bring about
some kind of agreement on non-traditional marks.
Until that agreement is reached, the expansion of the treaty to
cover all marks is severely restricted by the caveat that no
particular mark must be protected by a jurisdiction. That is not to
say that there is no benefit to trademark holders. Where
Contracting Parties were only prevented from imposing onerous
restrictions on two-dimensional visual marks, now procedures for
all marks will be standardized. This would be most useful to
applicants seeking to register multiple marks, some traditional and
some not, as the procedures to register both would be held to the
106. The New Singapore Treaty on the Law of Trademarks: What Does it
Change?, supra note 14, para. 7.
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same requirements. This does bring a certain level of added
predictability to Interested Parties, but this predictability is strictly
on a national level - it evens out varied procedures within the
same regime. This is a national issue, which could have been
solved at the national level, rather than through a treaty, which
should be focused on international issues. Where the Treaty fails to
produce increased predictability is when moving from one regime
to another. Even in closely-bound international trade groups, like
NAFTA, there is no predictability. In NAFTA, the United States
allows olfactory marks, °7 while Mexico, its third-largest trading
partner, 108 does not. 1°9
Following Professor Port's logic, if no attempt is made to
promote a single standard then harmonization has not occurred. In
this way, the Singapore Treaty is a step back from the 1994 Treaty.
In the 1994 Treaty, a standard was set - only visual, stationary
trademarks were to be protected, and all others were excluded.
This did provide predictability to parties seeking to register non-
traditional marks, namely that they would not receive the
protection of the 1994 Treaty. Under the Singapore Treaty, those
same parties would have to conduct a country-by-country search in
order to determine if they could rely on the Treaty, based on
whether that country accepted that type of mark, rather than on any
international standard.
Instead of simplifying the process, the Treaty has replaced one
potential stumbling block - the disparate treatment of different
types of marks by trademark offices - with a different form of
complexity - the interjection of a third party (WIPO) into the
proceedings. The Treaty does not accomplish harmonization in
the form of setting forth a single or even simplified standard. From
the point of view of the trademark holder, the various national
systems must still be approached individually, without
improvement in terms of unifying principles or standards.
107. See, e.g., In re Clarke, 17 U.S.P.Q.2d 1238 (T.T.A.B. 1990).
108. Historically, Mexico has been the United States' second-largest trading
partner, but was surpassed by China in October 2006. See U.S. Census Bureau,
Foreign Trade Statistics, October 2006, http://www.census.gov/foreign-
trade/statistics/highlights/top/topO6O.html (last visited Nov. 1, 2007).
109. Martin, Michaus R., An IP Overview after 12 Years of NAFTA and
TRIPs in Mexico, Global Competition Review.
326
22




The revision of Article Eight of the New Treaty, which deals
with Communications, had two major thrusts. First, the article
consolidated all of the separate rules governing different
communications (e.g. applications, registrations, etc.) from the
individual articles dealing with each communication into one
article. Second, the new article is modernized, in order to deal with
advances in technology. It addresses those changes which have
already come into place since the signing of the 1994 Treaty, as
well as providing for any future changes in the way trademark
offices do business.
The consolidation of all of the rules regarding communications
into Article Eight and having all other clauses refer back to that
Article is a prime example of rewriting the treaty with the intent of
minimizing any potential differences between systems and
promulgating a single, unified standard for all parties to follow."'
The language of the 1994 Treaty was superfluous in several
sections. Such sloppy drafting is a temptation for unscrupulous
trademark officials looking to circumvent the Treaty's mandates."'
With consolidation, a more even application of the rules governing
communications is not merely possible, but required.
The manner in which the new Article Eight is written, although
a sincere attempt at providing greater predictability for Interested
Persons, is not a true solution. It remains riddled with the same
caveats and exceptions from the 1994 Treaty which allow such a
degree of independence to the Contracting Parties that any single
standard is impossible to discern. While the rules have been
consolidated, they still only mandate certain boundaries of
behavior beyond which national trademark laws may not go. For
example, in Paragraph Three of Article Eight, the Treaty prevents
a Contracting party from requiring "attestation, notarization,
authentication, legalization or other certification of any
signature""' 2 in sub-clause (b), but then in sub-clause (c) allows
contracting parties to "require that evidence. . .where the Office
110. Singapore Treaty, supra note 7, art. 8.
111. See Frost, supra note 37.
112. Singapore Treaty, supra note 7, art. 8, para. 3(b).
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may reasonably doubt the authenticity of any signature."'' 3
As a means of keeping national systems harmonized despite any
technological advances, the treaty also refrains from setting out a
single standard and instead leaves the various trademark offices
free to accept or reject new ways of submitting correspondence,
such as via e-mail or web-based forms. The Singapore Treaty
meets trademark holders' expectations by at least acknowledging
the rapid advances in telecommunications since 1994."' However,
the new treaty provisions simply provide for use of future
technologies by trademark offices as they wish, rather than provide
a broad rule covering how these new technologies may or may not
be used. Additionally, the statement in the supplementary
Resolution clarifying that no nation will be forced to adopt new
technologies" 5 could presage wild differences in the processing of
applications, with developed countries going completely on-line
while developing nations still use paper and ink.
This can be seen by the manner in which Article Eight is
written. Each paragraph, with the exception of Paragraphs Five
and Six, specifies how a Contracting Party may impose
requirements on communications regarding trademarks. In terms
of modernization, the key paragraph, Paragraph One, states "Any
Contracting Party may choose the means of transmittal of
communications and whether it accepts... paper... electronic... or
any other form of communication.... 6
Paragraph Six is the main operative clause of Article Eight, and
now mandates that no other requirements beyond those mentioned
in Article Eight may be imposed by any Contracting Party.17 This
language was not included in the 1994 treaty. Article Eight now
operates as a ceiling for behavior rather than a floor. But within
the outer boundary provided by Paragraph Six, predictability
remains elusive. There is just too much room for local choice for
113. Id. art. 8, para. 3(c).
114. Advances in telecommunications being one of the prime sources in the
boom in globalized trade which necessitated a revision of the Trademark Law
Treaty in the first place. See The New Singapore Treaty on the Law of
Trademarks: What Does it Change?, supra note 14.
115. See Diplomatic Resolution, supra note 60.
116. Singapore Treaty, supra note 7, art. 8, para. 1.
117. Id. art. 8, para. 6.
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any Interested Person to rely upon the Treaty for guidance.
Paragraph Five is the best example of a unified rule. It provides
that the model forms attached to the Treaty shall be accepted by
any Contracting Party, creating a universally acceptable method of
communications." 8  But Paragraph Five existed in virtually the
same form in the 1994 treaty,1 9 and therefore cannot be regarded
as a move forward by the Singapore Treaty.
3. Relief Measures and Licensing of Trademarks
As regards movement towards a unified standard trademark law,
the New Treaty's addition of rules regarding 'Relief Measures for
Failure to Comply with Time Limits' and those governing the
'Licensing of Trademarks' operate in similar ways. Unfortunately,
they both act to set basic floors for behavior, but offer free rein for
nations to offer more protections than those set by the Treaty.
Because these new measures simply act as a floor, allowing for
wide variation from system to system, the Singapore Treaty does
not move towards a greater harmonization from the unification of
laws standpoint.
In the case of time limit relief measures, predictability is
provided by the fact that some form of relief must be provided to
parties who miss a deadline. However, the form of that relief can
vary widely from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. For the first form of
relief-relief granted before the time limit has passed-trademark
offices are given almost free rein to determine whether extensions
can be granted and how long those extensions may last. There is
no guidance whatsoever from the New Treaty. The Treaty does
mandate that Contracting Parties must offer one of three forms of
relief to parties who have already exceeded a time limit, 20 but
offers no guidance as to which of the choices should be given.
While this reduces the potential consequences down to a
manageable level, it can hardly be seen as a single unitary
standard. Additionally, the first optional time limit extension only
sets a minimum of two months for the extension, but trademark
offices are free to offer an extension of any length over that as they
118. Id. art. 8, para. 5.
119. 1994 Treaty, supra note 2, art. 3, para. 2(i).
120. Regulations Under the Singapore Treaty, supra note 27, Rule 9.
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please. The Treaty offers guidance, but for Interested Persons,
determining what the rule is still requires a case-by-case analysis.
Likewise, the acknowledgment of trademark licensing as a key
part of international trademark law creates an incentive for the
unification of the rules governing licensing. However, the new
rules set out by the Singapore Treaty do not lead to a single
standard which would govern trademark licensing, and more
particularly, the official recording of those licenses. The treaty
simply sets out a floor for what procedures various offices may
require, and in Article Seventeen, explicitly bans certain
requirements.121 Beyond that, the New Treaty simply lays out a
floor above which Contracting Parties are free to set whatever
rules and regulations they please.
Article Nineteen takes some steps towards real standardization
by laying out that the rights of licensees are preserved regardless
of recordal, without exception. 2' This is an excellent example of
how the Singapore Conference could have set out clear universal
rules to be applied by all member countries, without any leeway or
"may" clauses. But other than this key element, the remaining
rules regarding both relief from failure to meet deadlines and
recordal of licenses are set up loosely, outlining the basic
principles that Contracting Parties should abide by, but without
setting a single standard.
4. Trademark Treaty Assembly
The Trademark Assembly may produce a more unified set of
rules in the future with revisions to the Treaty and Regulations
which remove the existing exceptions and loopholes or address
substantive trademark law. When analyzing the effects of the
Singapore Treaty, however, any movement the Assembly may
make once it is established is far too speculative to really qualify
as concrete assurance that a greater unification of international
trademark laws will be achieved. Additionally, the fact that
consensus is the preferred route for decisions by the Assembly,
with a minimum of a two-thirds vote required for any action,
makes any progress on heavily-contested issues very difficult to
121. See Singapore Treaty, supra note 7, arts. 17-20.
122. Id. art. 19.
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envision. With such strict requirements for action, it is likely that
nations are more likely to independently adopt new standards and
then formalize them through use of the Assembly, rather than the
Assembly being the catalyst for any new substantive rules in
international trademark law.
B. Bridging the Gaps Between Different Trademark Regimes
If we assume that the rationale for the Singapore Treaty is not to
create a single standard for worldwide trademark law, but instead
to minimize the differences between existing trademark regimes,
then a different method of analysis is needed. Proponents of
bridging-the-gaps methods of harmonization like Professor Arthur
Rosett argue that universal rules often have the perverse effect of
causing more confusion in international business matters, and
separating international law from similar domestic regulation." 3
When a matter is purely domestic, the governing authority usually
has full control over what methods of regulation to use, but when
matters are partly domestic and partly international, that same
governing body is subject to international standards. This can
create a disconnect in the way trademark offices treat local and
international applicants. When bridging the gaps, rather than
finding the best method or most effective rule, the harmonizing
authority (here, the Singapore Conference) leaves discretion to
individual nations and seeks to minimize potential conflict
between the systems those nations have set up. The main goals in
this system are to harmonize outcomes and to encourage parties to
make the choices which are already the most beneficial. '24
The most relevant example for the Singapore Treaty is the
European Union's Community Trade Mark System.'25 When the
EU Council issued its first directive concerning trademark
harmonization, it did so by setting forth basic guidelines outlining
the rights (both floors and ceilings) of trademark holders and
123. See Arthur Rosett, Unification, Harmonization, Restatement,
Codification and Reform in International Commercial Law, 40 AM. J. COMP. L.
683, 686-88 (1992).
124. Id. at 696.
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ordering its member nations to amend their individual laws to
match these guidelines. The new trademark office, the Office of
Harmonization in the Internal Market (OHIM), functions as a
supplement to protections granted by national trademark offices.
Interested Parties may now rely on both national standards as well
as OHIM. 26
Professor Port cited Stephen Zamora's analysis of
harmonization in NAFTA'27 as a key example of this theory of
harmonization.'28  "Harmonization," according to Professor
Zamora, "does not entail the adoption of a single, model set of
rules, but instead implies a wide range of ways in which
differences in legal concepts... are accommodated."' 29
The Singapore Treaty is certainly very careful to leave room for
individual variation; thus, it would make sense that the treaty
would attempt foremost to bridge the gaps between different
systems.
1. Expansion of the Treaty
The most significant way in which the New Treaty attempts to
minimize the differences between the rules of its various
signatories is the expansion of the treaty to cover any form of
trademark recognized by a particular nation.
This change bridged gaps by ensuring that whatever a particular
country's policy towards recognizing non-standard marks (three-
dimensional, sound, olfactory, motion, hologram, etc.,) the rules of
the Treaty apply to all of its trademarking rules and regulations.
This enables a person familiar with one form of mark in one
jurisdiction to travel to another jurisdiction and encounter a system
based on those same rules. The old system resulted in many
nations having one base set of procedures for visual, two-
126. See Office for Harmonization in the Internal Market [OHIM], The
Commnity Trademark in Practice, http://oami.europa.eu/en/mark/role/
brochure/brlenl 1.htm (last visited Nov. 1, 2007).
127. Stephen Zamora, NAFTA and the Harmonization of Domestic Legal
Systems: The Side Effects of Free Trade, 12 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 401, 427
(1995). (considering NAFTA as an example of harmonization through the
bridging of gaps between systems).
128. Port, supra note 100, at 34.
129. Zamora, supra note 127, at 403.
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dimensional marks and a completely separate way of operating for
the small number of non-traditional marks, as Professor Rosett
predicted would come of excessive focus on the unification of
laws. Under the new regime, one basic set of standards now
governs the breadth and depth of marks and any new forms of
marks which future advances in technology may make possible.
From the perspective of one interested in minimizing the gaps
between different systems, this helps remove pockets of trademark
law where the gaps between various systems have allegedly grown
larger - non-standard marks. Now the similarities between the
rules remain the same, whether a mark is of the sort generally
accepted worldwide or is a newer, less traditional mark. This is
done without mandating a single, universal standard as to the
validity of non-standard marks, but ensures that the procedural
differences between systems are minimized. For example, the
requirements established governing multiple registrations now can
be used by an applicant seeking to register both two- and three-
dimensional forms of the same logo.
2. Procedural Issues
The Singapore Treaty also bridges the gaps in the more
procedural areas, including the major changes in
"Communications," "Relief Measures in Case of Failure to
Comply with Time Limits" and "Licensing of Trademarks," but to
a lesser degree.
All of the reforms in each of the procedural areas set certain
minimum requirements on how trademark offices may deal with
those procedural issues, but this new floor can hardly be
considered a way to minimize the differences between systems.
For example, when Interested Parties fail to meet a deadline, some
relief must be allowed. But it is left to the respective Contracting
Parties to determine the particular form of relief. When an
extension of the deadline is granted as relief, the Contracting
Parties are free to choose any length beyond two months that they
feel is appropriate. 3 ° At the same time, the Contracting Party may
or may not simply continue the proceedings without the need for a
130. Regulations Under the Singapore Treaty, supra note 27, Rule 9.
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formal extension, and the rights of the holder may or may not be
reinstated, depending on which of the provided methods of relief
that particular nation's government has decided to be the best
option. "'
Likewise, a trademark licensee now only has to file a single
request for recordal of multiple licenses,'32 a basic guarantee which
Interested Persons can rely on in any of the Contracting Parties.
But this is hardly an example of common ground as the exact
procedural requirements can vary widely from nation to nation,
and applicants must meet certain requirements to qualify for the
single application. While the new requirement certainly makes life
easier for applicants, it does nothing to regularize the worldwide
trademark system and to bridge gaps for those moving from one
system to another. A far more effective reform would have been
to add guidelines as to the procedural restrictions Contracting
Parties can impose on those license recordal applications, or even
to go as far as to include trademark licensing within the Madrid
System. The restrictions in Article Seventeen which prevent a
Contracting Party from requiring that licensing parties provide
copies of the mark registration, licensing agreements or any
similar documents 33 provides a basic floor for behavior, but once
again, this cannot be considered an accommodation of separate
rules within a single system, but simply a low level of constraint
on the current hodgepodge of trademark rules. These reforms are
certainly good starting points which reflect international
consensus, but to call this an effective gap-bridging measure
would set the bar for gap-bridging so low that almost any measure
which regulates trademark law could be considered an effective
way of bridging gaps between trademark systems.
3. Trademark Assembly
The Trademark Assembly seems more geared toward proposing
new regulations rather than minimizing the differences between
the trademark regimes already in place. Additionally, the effects of
the Assembly are far too speculative at this time to represent any
131. Singapore Treaty, supra note 7, art. 14, para. 1.
132. Id. art. 17, para. 3.
133. Id. art. 17, para. 4; see also supra text accompanying notes 77-83.
30
DePaul Journal of Art, Technology & Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 17, Iss. 2 [2016], Art. 4
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol17/iss2/4
SINGAPORE SLING
real achievement in gap-bridging.
C. Creating the Impression ofAccord
Professor Port's third category of harmonization is not a
definition used by proponents of international harmonization, but
instead by those who see it as a futile, or even counterproductive,
effort. Professor Martin Boodman best articulated this point of
view when he said that harmonization "is either redundant because
it already exists, or meaningless because it describes any and every
comparative legal analysis." '134 Should the nations behind the new
WIPO Development Agenda be able to turn WIPO into a more
dynamic organization, the Assembly certainly has the potential to
become a major force for serious discussion and reform of the
major issues within trademark law.
In terms of the appearance of international accord, the various
provisions of the Singapore Treaty all act in similar ways. Each of
the new sections deals with a gap left uncovered by the 1994
Treaty. The 1994 Treaty specifically excluded coverage of non-
standard marks, was silent on the issues of licensing and relief for
failure to meet a time limit, and was simply outdated when dealing
with communications. The Singapore Treaty provides broader
regulation to cover each of these gaps, therefore creating the
impression of accord over them. Now, proponents of the treaty,
when asked about the discrepancies in various national treatment
of issues such as the licensing of trademarks can point to the
Singapore Treaty as an example of agreement between all of the
Contracting Parties on those issues. The elimination of red tape
and the "modernization" of the treaty to accommodate new
technologies are the primary foci of enthusiastic press releases
which use the Treaty as an example of WIPO's commitment to
harmonizing trademark law.13 Likewise, expansion of the
Treaty's scope to cover these areas is the easiest way of showing
134. Martin Boodman, The Myth of Harmonization of Laws, 39 AM. J.
COMP. L. 699, 707 (1991).
135. See Canadian Intellectual Property Office, News Updates - July 10,
2006, http://strategis.ic.gc.ca/sc-mrksv/cipo/new/ciponews/news-july06-e.html
(explaining the adoption of the Singapore Treaty) (last visited Nov. 1, 2007).
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progress and growth. 136 If the Treaty had instead chosen to deal
with substantive issues such as actual use requirements, proof of
progress by WIPO would not be as clear. While the Singapore
Treaty stands out by delving into the previously uncovered areas
of licensing, relief measures, non-standard marks, and electronic
communications, its changes are not as significant as they would
be had it addressed more substantive issues.
Although less objective than the other two categories, Professor
Port's third category of harmonization - actions which create the
impression of accord or agreement between parties - seems to be
the most fitting for the Singapore Treaty. Unfortunately, the
Treaty is just that. It acts more to create the illusion of progress
and standardization of trademark law than any actual progress or
standardization. Even when using the more lenient "bridging the
gaps" theory, the Singapore Treaty still falls short of meaningful
change, and the main result is the appearance of further
international cooperation.
V. CONCLUSION
The Singapore Treaty sets out to "improve" the state of
international trademark law, but does so in an extremely haphazard
fashion. Instead of setting out a concrete goal and working to best
achieve that goal, the framers of the Treaty seem to have entered
into the treaty with the best of intentions, but with no clear outline
of what the end result of the Treaty was supposed to resemble.
The resulting treaty reflects this. Rather than making clear rules,
or even addressing real problems of moving between various
systems, the Singapore Treaty establishes broad outlines of
behavior, which may or may not improve the lives of Interested
Parties or trademark officials. This cannot be characterized as
"harmonization" in any way. Instead, the New Treaty is
comprised of superficial changes made to create the impression of
progress. This "fluff' in the place of real harmonization is the
reason countries like Brazil and Argentina have been pushing the
new Agenda for WIPO. If the Singapore Treaty is any guide,
however, that agenda may just be another piece of window
136. See The New Singapore Treaty on the Law of Trademarks: What Does
it Change?, supra note 14.
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